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COURT REPORTS

also cautioned that Florida's reliance on the EPA to review its List
could eliminate one layer of protection envisioned by the CWA in that
Florida's reliance on EPA's review would give the power to enforce
pollution controls solely to the federal agency.
Lastly, the court addressed the Environmental Groups' argument
on the merits that the district court erroneously granted summary
judgment based on its conclusion that the Rule did not create new or
revised water quality standards. In Miccosukee, the district court similarly failed to conduct a thorough review of the Rule's effect on Florida's water quality standards concerning the Everglades Forever Act,
and the court found that EPA had a mandatory duty to review any new
or revised state standards. The court found that FDEP and EPA applied the Rule when they created and approved the updated changes
to the List. Thus, if water bodies under pre-existing testing methodologies would have been included on the List and were left off due to
the Rule, then the Rule would have created new or revised water quality standards, even if the language of the regulation said otherwise.
Therefore, the court held that the district court erred by relying on
Florida's failure to follow the mandated procedures to amend its water
quality standards and by failing to conduct a thorough review of the
effect of the Rule on Florida's water quality standards.
In conclusion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit held that the Environmental Groups had standing to sue, their
claim was not mooted by the EPA's review of the Impaired Waters List,
and the district court erred in determining as a matter of law that the
Impaired Waters Rule did not establish new or revised water quality
standards. The court vacated the final order of summary judgment
and remanded for further proceedings to determine what effect, if any,
the Impaired Waters Rule had on Florida's existing water quality standards.
JuliaHerron

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Edison Elec. Inst. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 391 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (holding the EPA's whole effluent test methods were not invalid
because the EPA did not ignore relevant record evidence, it adequately
accounted for its departure from its usual criteria and procedures for
ensuring scientific validity of test methods, and its actions were not
arbitrary and capricious).
Edison Electric Institute and other organizations representing corporate and municipal dischargers (collectively "Dischargers") brought
petitions for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia claiming Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA")
whole effluent toxicity ("WET") test methods were invalid. WET tests
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measure the descriptive criterion for effluent under the Clean Water
Act. Dischargers claimed (1) the EPA did not adhere to its usual criteria and procedures for ensuring scientific validity of WET test methods,
(2) WET test methods produced an unacceptably high number of false
positives, (3) the EPA failed to establish detection limits for WET test
methods, and (4) the EPA failed to demonstrate the applicability and
availability of WET testing.
First, Dischargers claimed the EPA did not adhere to usual criteria
and procedures for ensuring the scientific validity of the test methods,
which included accuracy, precision, practical applicability, establishment of detection limits, and the minimization of external interference. EPA conceded the WET tests did not incorporate all factors, but
the court held the EPA adequately accounted for any departure from
such factors. EPA admitted accuracy, which consisted of precision and
bias, in the technical sense was inapplicable to WET testing. However,
EPA broke down the accuracy analysis into precision and bias. EPA
conceded the inapplicability of bias but stated WET test methods satisfied precision and the court held EPA's action was not arbitrary or capricious. Since, WET testing was biological, relying on live organisms,
EPA could not attain a "true value."
Second, Dischargers argued WET test methods produced a high
number of false positives. Dischargers defined "false positive" far more
expansively than the EPA. Dischargers were concerned that WET tests
had the potential to produce arbitrary permit violations. However, the
court felt the EPA demonstrated the WET test methods produced a
variation that was not excessive. Further, EPA provided a safeguard by
limiting false positive rates to at most five percent, while allowing false
negative rates up to twenty percent.
Third, Dischargers objected to EPA's failure to establish detection
limits for WET test methods. However, EPA only applied detection
limits to tests that rely on instrumental measurements and because
WET testing is biological and experimental, EPA did not apply detection limit concepts. Further, the ratified test methods had a built-in
mechanism, which served the same basic purpose as detection limits in
an instrumental test.
Finally, Dischargers claimed EPA failed to demonstrate the availability and applicability of WET testing. Dischargers claimed the EPA
violated its own guidelines requiring a blind study because laboratories
chosen for the trial of WET testing knew in advance that they would
participate. However, the court stated Dischargers misinterpreted
blind testing because the EPA only required blind samples, which the
laboratories received. In addition, Dischargers alleged the EPA ignored results of the peer review process. However, the court found
EPA published an extensive response to peer comments and acknowledged the peer-review process in its revisions to the Final Rule in the
Federal Register.
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Therefore, the court rejected Dischargers' petition for review since
Dischargers did not demonstrate EPA ignored relevant evidence, contradicted its own policies without explanation, or acted arbitrarily or
capriciously.
Kevin Lazar
S.E. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Harvey, 400 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(holding a federal court lacked jurisdiction because a district court's
conditional approval of a settlement agreement was not a final disposition that rendered the case moot).
The States of Alabama and Florida sought review of an order by the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia that approved
a settlement agreement between the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"), various Georgia municipal and county water authorities ("Water Supply Providers"), and Southeastern Federal Power
Customers, Inc. ("Southeastern"), and then the court dismissed the
action as moot. The settlement agreement provided that the Corps
was to enter into renewable ten-year contracts with the Water Supply
Providers and Southeastern for the lease of water storage space.
Southeastern filed this suit in December 2000 to enjoin the Corps
from allowing increased water withdrawals by the Water Supply Providers. The Corps, Southeastern, and the Water Supply Providers reached
the settlement agreement in January 2003. Subsequently, Florida and
Alabama intervened in the action, alleging the settlement violated a
1990 stay order issued by the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama, which prohibited contracts or agreements relating to a suit Alabama filed against the Corps for allowing
increased water withdrawal by the Water Supply Providers. On October 15, 2003, the Alabama district court issued a preliminary injunction, but the District of Columbia district court denied a motion to
dismiss, transfer, or abate on November 7, 2003. Thus, two separate
actions remained. On February 10, 2004, the District of Columbia district court rejected Florida and Alabama's challenge and ordered instatement of the settlement agreement conditioned upon revocation of
the Alabama district court's preliminary injunction. Two days later,
the District of Columbia district court issued an order dismissing the
action as moot, based upon the District of Columbia district court's
approval of the settlement agreement.
On appeal, the United States Appeals Court for the District of Columbia Circuit considered its jurisdiction to hear this case. The appeals court stated it could review district court actions resulting only in
final orders. That court determined federal courts lacked jurisdiction
to consider the merits of moot claims, because judicial power extended
only to "cases or controversies." When a court already resolved the
issues presented or the parties no longer had a legally recognizable

